We examine the determinants and consequences of firms' choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security-related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm-specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security-related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid-ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.
INTRODUCTION
The literature on the costs and benefits of disclosure has been a topic of significant research (Verrecchia, 2001) . Proprietary costs (Verrecchia, 1983) and litigation risk (Healy and Palepu, 2001 ) are two of the primary types of disclosure costs firms could face. We investigate a new cost of disclosure in a unique setting in Brazil, where some firms explicitly refuse to comply with a new regulation to disclose executive compensation details alleging increased personal security costs 1 for executives and their families. The new rule, CVM Ordinance 480, requires publicly traded firms to disclose quantitative and qualitative information about their executive compensation practices in the proxy statement.
2 Despite the mandated disclosure, many firms refused to comply with the new rule. The claim is that the release of compensation information would expose executives to crimes such as kidnapping. According to this argument, the disclosure of compensation increases significantly the personal costs for executives, as the following quote from the Brazilian Institute of Financial Executives illustrates:
It is clearly evident the security concerns that such regulation causes, not only for the executives but also for their families. After all, with the high criminality rates in the large cities -exactly where most of the executives live -it is worrisome, to say the least, that complying with the ordinance makes the compensation received by people easily identifiable by the positions they hold. (5th Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro, 2010) 3 The ongoing heated debate about executive compensation disclosure regulation further motivates our study. The rapid evolution of executive compensation practices and the option-backdating scandals in the mid-2000s prompted an increase in the demand for executive compensation disclosure practices (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; and Cox, 2006) . In 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) changed the disclosure rules of executive compensation, prompting major changes such as the inclusion of the Compensation Discussion Analysis (CD&A) section in the proxy statement (Robinson et al., 2011; and SEC, 2006a) . Recently, as a response to the financial crisis, the United States Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which includes provisions regarding executive compensation, such as 'say on pay' and the disclosure of pay-for-performance schemes (SEC, 2012) . A prominent rationale behind additional executive compensation disclosure is that new disclosures help investors better understand and monitor firms' compensation practices (Cox, 2006; and Robinson et al., 2011) , which in turn reduces agency costs. The consensus among regulators seems to be that the disclosure of executive compensation plays an important role in corporate governance. 4 The Brazilian disclosure reform began in 2008 with a public consultation (akin to the comment period) on the new requirements, and ended with CVM Ordinance 480 coming into effect in December 2009. Much like the recent changes in the US, CVM Ordinance 480 requires publicly traded firms to disclose quantitative and qualitative information about their executive compensation practices in the proxy statement. The major requirement is to disclose, on an annual basis, the total, maximum, minimum and average compensation paid to the executive officers, the members of the board of directors and the members of the audit committee. 5 It further calls for the disclosure of compensation components (e.g. cash and equity compensation) by group (e.g., officers and directors). The Brazilian regulation somewhat mimics the requirements for the CD&A and Summary Compensation Table required in the US. In 2010, approximately 15% of the firms (representing 30% of total market value traded on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange -Bovespa) declined to comply with the new regulation (IBGC, 2011) , despite it being applicable to all publicly traded firms in Brazil.
Firms that managed to circumvent the requirements of CVM Ordinance 480 did so through a court injunction. Injunction firms alleged that disclosing executive compensation information would reveal the identity of top executives. Criminals would then use this information to plan kidnappings and other crimes against executives or even executives' families and property. 6 Under this argument, the change in regulation increases executives' personal costs considerably. Because the executives' human capital is a key resource for the firm's prospects and going concern, a firm's decision to file for an injunction can be interpreted as a rational, value-maximizing response to protect a rare and valuable resource. Frantz et al. (2013) show that shareholders would be better off committing upfront not to disclose executive compensation whenever possible, even when disclosure is mandated. The rationale behind this argument is that the potential benefits of disclosure to shareholders (e.g., increased monitoring and lower likelihood of rent extraction by executives) is outweighed by the proprietary costs associated with disclosing executive information to strategic competitors.
An alternative argument is that non-compliance with the new regulation represents an agency cost and injunction firms divert attention by evoking emotionally charged security concerns in legal arguments. By preventing investors from obtaining more information about a firm's compensation practices, executives can enjoy greater private benefits and lower levels of monitoring. This line of argument is consistent with extant research finding a positive relationship between weak compliance with executive compensation disclosure in the US and proxies of agency costs (Robinson et al., 2011) .
We exploit the trade-off between the potential benefits of executive compensation disclosure regulation and a more subtle, intangible reason for non-disclosure: the personal costs that executives face related to the disclosure of executive compensation. In an attempt to disentangle these two effects, in addition to including proxies for agency costs in our determinants of an injunction model, we examine potential consequences of non-compliance. We focus on three measures of information asymmetry identified in prior research (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) : the firm's stock bid-ask spread, trading 5 CVM Ordinance 480 defines compensation as the sum of fixed cash compensation, direct or indirect benefits, cash variable compensation, post-employment benefits and stock-based payments (CVM, 2009) . 6 In addition to revealing and/or clarifying the identity of top executives, the disclosure of executive compensation would reveal economic information that criminals could use in their decision-making process. For example, upon taking an executive (or a member of his/her family) hostage, criminals could have a stronger sense of the executive's wealth and could use such information to formulate a ransom. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
volume, and volatility. An association between injunction and measures of information asymmetry would shed light on an investor's assessment of the decision not to disclose executive compensation. 7 We build our sample using the newly required Brazilian proxy statements (formulários de referência) for every publicly traded firm in Bovespa (Brazil's major stock exchange). We hand-collect all proxy statements available for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, which contain compensation and profile data for the executive officers and board members. Our sample consists of 331 firm-year observations (195 distinct firms), of which 59 firm-year observations (36 distinct firms) use the preliminary court injunction not to disclose executive compensation details. Our main regression specification is a prediction model that attempts to explain why some firms choose not to comply with the new regulation. Our variable of interest is the total robbery rate (our proxy for security-related costs), which we measure at the state level. 8 We control for potential determinants of disclosure, including macroeconomic and social welfare variables, firm characteristics, proprietary costs, and corporate governance attributes, including family ownership structure.
We find that total robbery rate is positively associated with the use of the injunction to avoid disclosing executive compensation information, after controlling for an alternate measure of executive's personal costs (i.e., estimated CEO compensation level), and potential economic, social and political costs of compensation disclosure.
9
These findings represent the first investigation where executives' security-related costs relate to disclosure decisions. Our second specification assesses the ex post consequences of non-compliance on bid-ask spreads, trading volume and volatility of stock prices. Our results indicate that injunction firms experience an increase in their bid-ask spreads, but experience no change in trading volume or volatility. We interpret the bid-ask spread results as evidence that investors are leery of the injunction and consider it as evidence of agency costs. This result also complements Verrecchia and Weber (2006) , who find that firms that withhold information from investors face increased bid-ask spreads. Our results also corroborate Shin (2003) , in the sense that market participants interpret the non-disclosure as bad news, leading to an increase in uncertainty.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to consider a setting where some firms explicitly reject complying with disclosure rules alleging lack of security for executives. Brazil is an interesting and important country to study because of its size, traditionally high private benefits of control, and relatively weak corporate governance (Black et al., 2010) . The purportedly high personal costs for executives exacerbates this tension. The trade-off between the executives' personal costs and 7 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) explain that bid-ask spreads measure information asymmetry explicitly, as 'less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, implying smaller bid-ask spreads' (p. 99). Trading volume and volatility, on the other hand, measure information asymmetry less explicitly, as other factors such as risk preferences, portfolio rebalancing decisions and liquidity shocks can affect volume and volatility (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) . Hence, because our main interest is in determining whether the decision not to disclose executive compensation is reflective of agency costs (due to adverse selection risk), our main predictions for these tests focus on the bid-ask spreads. 8 We choose robbery over other types of crime based on the claim that executives are concerned about potential crimes against themselves, their families (e.g., kidnapping) or their property. Alternative measures, such as kidnaping rates, are significantly underreported due to the victim's fear of retaliation. In addition, we measure robbery rates at the state level because, unlike in the US where municipal governments are responsible for public safety, in Brazil, state governments hold this responsibility. 9 We discuss how we 'back into' CEO compensation for injunction firms in Appendix A. the stockholders' benefits resulting from firm compliance with the regulation does not seem to have an obvious equilibrium, ex ante (Frantz et al., 2013) . Our research takes an initial step toward shedding light on this issue and might be relevant in the regulatory debate, as it informs the potential differential costs and benefits of executives' compensation disclosure. These results also shed light on the potential paths firms may use to avoid compliance with proposed regulation, and on the costs of non-compliance to shareholders.
In the next section, we provide details about compensation disclosure requirements and security level in Brazil, discuss extant research in the area, and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 provides detail about the data. Section 4 describes the estimation methods and results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT (i) Executive Compensation Disclosure Requirements in Brazil
Brazil has a long record of weak legal environment, enforcement and firm governance (La Porta et al., 2000; and Dyck and Zingales, 2004) . Extant research indicates that disclosure practices in Brazil have been stagnating for years, with no signs of improvement (Ponte et al., 2007) . Prior to 2009, executive compensation disclosure in Brazil was limited, even among large multinational firms (Beuren and da Silva, 2012) . In an attempt to address these issues, the CVM released a proposal for new disclosure rules for public consultation (akin to a comment period) in December 2008.
10 After incorporating the feedback from the public consultation, the CVM issued Ordinance 480 in December 2009.
The new disclosure rules are similar in spirit to those set by the SEC regarding the CD&A sections of the proxy statement (the Brazilian counterpart is the 'formulário de referência', or reference form). Although CVM Ordinance 480 is considered the most complex and comprehensive set of disclosure rules ever implemented in Brazil (Chaves, 2010) , the Brazilian compensation disclosure rules ended up being less stringent than the SEC's requirements in release number 33-8732A (Victor et al., 2010) .
11 During the consultation period, the original proposal found heavy resistance from prominent and important players, such as ABRASCA (Brazilian Association of Public Companies). The pressure led CVM to adopt a compromise between 'the desirable and the possible' (Chaves, 2010) . Specifically, the final regulation only demands firms to disclose the maximum, minimum and average compensation received within each group (executive officers, members of the board of directors and the members of the audit committee). It also requires the disclosure of total group compensation, number of group members, group compensation components (cash 10 The CVM bases its model on the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) shelf registration system, a concept established in developed countries like the US, Japan, France, and the UK (Chaves, 2010) . In this system, a single document, the shelf document, contains all relevant information about the firm and is filed periodically with the regulator (Chaves, 2010) . 11 This release mandates the disclosure of the Summary Compensation Table, which contains both current and deferred compensation (e.g., stock options and restricted stock), and current earnings or awards that are part of a compensation plan. The information is typically reported on a per-capita basis for the top five executives, including the CEO and the CFO. It also requires a CD&A section, which highlights the factors underlying compensation policies and decisions reflected on data presented in the Summary Compensation Table (SEC, 2006b ). and equity-based compensation), and qualitative information regarding the design of compensation plans. Even with the new regulation, the degree of disclosure regarding compensation remains low in Brazil when compared to the US (Victor et al., 2010) .
Despite the comparatively limited regulation, in March 2010 the Instituto Brasileiro de Executivos de Finanças (IBEF) claimed the disclosure requirement on executive compensation to be unconstitutional, and obtained a preliminary court injunction. The injunction gives the right to IBEF's members and affiliated firms not to comply with the disclosure of executive compensation.
12 Surprisingly, IBEF neither expressed an opinion during the consultation period, nor revealed any kind of position regarding the regulation until the filing (Chaves, 2010) .
In an attempt to enforce the compensation disclosure, the Brazilian regulator (CVM) tried to overrule the injunction by appealing to a superior court. However, in October 2010 the Superior Federal Court 13 decided to sustain the injunction until the definitive judgment on the matter, which may take several years due to the inefficiency of the Brazilian judiciary system. The idea behind the Superior Federal Court's decision is that once disclosure of executives' compensation occurs, it is impossible to return to the status quo. A timeline of the major events is shown in Figure 1 , and the injunction is still valid as of April 2016.
As of August 2010, according to the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC, 2011), 41 firms had taken advantage of the preliminary court injunction to avoid disclosing quantitative executive compensation information. These injunction firms, which represent approximately 30% of total market value traded on the 12 Since virtually all publicly traded firms in Brazil are members of the IBEF, a question arises: why did any IBEF firms choose to disclose when the injunction gave the ability to avoid disclosure? We propose that some firms decided to comply with the law out of legitimacy concerns (Börzel et al., 2010) . Checkel (2001) proposes that legitimacy relates to 'appropriateness' and the sense of moral obligation within the law, so firms comply with the law because it brings legitimacy to the firm. Based on this argument, we propose that some firms decided to comply with the law (even though they had an opportunity not to comply) to increase their legitimacy and to avoid potential costs of non-compliance. 13 The Superior Federal Court sits above the regional courts of appeals (Regional Federal Courts) and below the Supreme Federal Court (which, like the US Supreme Court, deals with constitutional matters).
Bovespa, represents our group of interest. Recent research finds that Brazilian firms remain relatively opaque thanks to the protection of the court injunction (Schiehll et al., 2013) . Appendix B provides a list of the companies taking advantage of the injunction.
Prior research examining the implications of disclosure-related regulatory changes has not been able to address the issue of non-compliance as directly as we do. Some studies examine lobby efforts against more stringent rules (Lo, 2003) , while others use the degree of compliance with mandatory rules (Ettredge et al., 2011; and Peters and Romi, 2013) . We take advantage of the direct observation of firms that explicitly reject complying and firms that duly comply with the new regulation to study the determinants and consequences of non-disclosure.
(ii) Security Level in Brazil
One of the main arguments that Brazilian firms used in court is the concern for the safety of executives and their families. They argue that the executive, his family, and his property are at increased risk for potential violent crimes once his compensation is publicly available. High crime rates in large cities, where most firms' headquarters are located and where executives and their families live, exacerbate this risk. Such worries may be genuine. According to The Economist (2011) , in 2010, two surveys found that chief executives and company directors earned more in São Paulo than in New York, London, Singapore or Hong Kong. However, according to the article, a high criminality rate is among the factors that make it difficult to attract foreign executives.
Executives do have concerns about safety in Brazil. In an interview to the financial press, the attorney of the IBEF argues that kidnappers understand executive compensation levels (Tenoue, 2010) . In the same line of argument, Mr Antonio Duarte Carvalho de Castro, the president of ABRASCA, argues that there is a critical difference between estimating and precisely knowing someone's compensation (Tenoue, 2010) . Mr Castro further argues that because of high criminality levels in Brazil, many executives avoid public exposure and maintain discretion about their lifestyle. Under this scenario, compensation disclosure would be the main source for criminals to identify wealthy directors and executives in Brazil. Further, the information disclosed would reveal economic information (e.g., executive wealth) that criminals could use to plan an abduction and demand a ransom.
Brazil ranks among the most violent countries in the world. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2009, the homicide rate in Brazil was 22.7 for every 100,000 individuals (UNODC, 2011) . This number is comparable to other countries with a recent history of conflicts, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (21.7 in 2008) , Mexico (18.1 in 2010) , and Russia (11.2 in 2009). These statistics lend support to the argument of executives' angst about disclosing compensation. Figure 2 shows the homicide rates of Brazil and selected countries for the latest year the information is available.
Despite economic and social progress, such as the attempt to improve living conditions in the favelas (Brazilian slums) in the city of Rio de Janeiro and to lower crack-cocaine addiction in a neighborhood known as Cracolândia in São Paulo, Brazilian cities are still among the most violent places in the world. In the state of São Paulo, where the headquarters of many firms in our sample are located, the total robbery rate in 2009 was 794.7 for every 100,000 individuals. This is almost six times the rate in the United States (132.7) or Russia (143.6) and more than 13 times the robbery rate in Germany (59.8). In 2009, according to the Ministry of Justice of Brazil, the total robbery rate in the Federal District was 1,005.9 for every 100,000 individuals. The state of Rio de Janeiro, known for its beautiful landscape and a global tourist destination, has the second highest robbery rate in the country, 862.5 for every 100,000. These numbers describe a scenario where the probability of becoming victim to a major crime ranks among the highest in the world. Based on this evidence, it is plausible that firms located in places where criminality is high are genuinely concerned about releasing information about executive compensation.
(iii) Disclosure Literature
Whether disclosure regulation results in positive net benefits is still an open question. Unraveling results (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; and Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) suggest that, assuming no disclosure costs, firms should voluntarily disclose all of their private information. In a perfect market, firms would evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosure to find an equilibrium point. However, because firms operate in markets with significant frictions, full disclosure equilibrium may not occur (Verrecchia, 1983) . A prominent argument in support of increasing disclosure is that a firm is able to lower its costs of capital by reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) . While there may be clear benefits, firms must also consider the potential costs associated with the decision to disclose information. Direct firm-specific costs include the effort necessary to prepare and provide accounting information, related opportunity costs in the disclosure process (Ribstein, 2005) , and litigation risk (Healy and Palepu, 2001) . Firms also face indirect proprietary costs, as other parties (such as competitors) may exploit the information released, effectively decreasing disclosure incentives ex ante (Verrecchia, 1983; and Frantz et al., 2013) . In sum, firms assess the trade-off between costs and benefits of disclosure to decide whether or not to disclose (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) .
In the context of executive compensation, higher levels of disclosure about compensation plans should increase investors' ability to monitor and evaluate executives (Cox, 2006; and Robinson et al., 2011) , which may lower agency costs. Nonetheless, the personal security-related costs faced by the executive could be serious enough for firms to decline to disclose mandatory information, and to some extent may be optimal from the shareholders' standpoint (Frantz et al., 2013) . We exploit and test this tension in our study.
(iv) Executive Compensation Disclosure
Empirical research examines the implications of executive compensation disclosure, finding that managers use discretion in the disclosure of information (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; and Nagar et al., 2003) . While prior literature focuses on voluntary disclosure, we investigate a scenario of explicit non-disclosure of mandatory information. Sheu et al. (2010) find that the market reacts positively to firms' announcements to disclose comprehensive information on their compensation practices voluntarily. However, managers have incentives to disclose information strategically and selectively (Beyer et al., 2010) . Thus, we argue that strong enough incentives may lead to a decision not to comply with the regulation.
Some theoretical models consider possible disclosure-related costs faced by executives. Since there are also costs associated with disclosing proprietary information, when the executive withholds information, the market cannot ascertain the real reason for non-disclosure (e.g., whether it is 'bad' or 'not good enough' news) (Verrecchia, 1983) . Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) show that disclosure of private information may reduce executives' private benefits due to the increased monitoring and disciplinary actions the owners take based on the information they receive. Frantz et al. (2013) also conclude that no equilibrium of full disclosure of executive compensation is possible, when one considers the interests from both shareholders and executive officers. Although these models do not fit our scenario directly, we believe that they provide an intuition for our research. These models explicitly show that managers assess personal costs of disclosing private information, which may prevent disclosure. We propose that security-related costs of the manager may affect a firm's decision to deny disclosing mandatory information.
(v) Hypotheses
We believe that our setting permits us to assess management's utility and disutility from making compensation disclosure for two reasons. First, we have a mandatory (exogenous) requirement that simultaneously affect all firms in our sample, and we observe both the subset of firms that do comply and the subset of firms that do not comply with the rule. Second, as we elaborate in Section 2(ii), security level is a real concern in Brazil, so it is reasonable to assume that managers consider this information in their decision-making process.
Thus, the assessment of the tradeoff between benefits and costs to disclosure, when such a disclosure is costly to the manager making it, may be a determinant to firms' decision to comply (or not) with the regulation. We construct our main hypothesis considering the tension that exists between the potential benefits of executive compensation disclosure regulation (e.g., improved monitoring) and the potential personal costs that executives face related to the disclosure of their compensation. Our first hypothesis (H1) is a direct translation of the main argument presented by non-complying firms in court:
H1: A firm's decision not to disclose executive compensation is positively related to executives' security-related costs.
Executive security-related costs may be a genuine reason to use the injunction not to disclose executive compensation details. Indeed, according to Frantz et al. (2013) , committing to non-disclosure can be optimal for shareholders. However, an alternative explanation is that executives are just creating an excuse to maintain low levels of monitoring and to increase managerial appropriation. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) argue that managerial appropriation can take many forms, including 'outright stealing of cash, the use of excess cash for pet projects from which the executive derives some private utility, lavish business trips, or simply excessive compensation.' In order to shed light on these seemingly competing explanations, we analyze how the decision to use the court injunction to avoid disclosure of executives' compensation affects proxies of information asymmetry. Shin (2003) models the effects of disclosure on asset returns to study information dissemination in financial markets, and concludes that the market interprets the absence of news as bad news, which in turn increases information risk. In our context, because some executives explicitly deny the disclosure of mandatory information, it is reasonable to expect that market participants interpret it as a source of adverse selection and information risk (Verrecchia and Weber, 2006) . 14 If investors do not find the security-related costs explanation as credible, it is possible to observe increases in bid-ask spreads and stock price volatility, and declines in firms' stock trade volume. Hence, our second hypothesis (H2), in the alternate form, follows:
H2: Firms that do not comply with the disclosure of executive compensation requirement experience increases in stock price bid-ask spread and volatility, and decreases in stock trade volume. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) explain that bid-ask spreads measure information asymmetry explicitly, as 'the bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection problem that arises from transacting in firm shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed 14 Leuz and Wysocki (2008) view increased market liquidity as one of the main benefits of disclosure. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) study German firms that have increased levels of disclosure by switching to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) regimes and find a decrease in the bid-ask spread and an increase in trade volume. 
.'s 2010 Proxy Statement
Note: The translation below shows that the court injunction is the reason for the non-disclosure of maximum, minimum and average compensation.
investors. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which, in turn implies smaller bid-ask spreads' (p. 99). On the other hand, trading volume and volatility measure information asymmetry less explicitly, since other factors such as risk preferences, portfolio rebalancing decisions and liquidity shocks can affect these two measures (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) . Hence, because our main interest is in determining whether non-disclosing executive compensation is reflective of agency costs (due to adverse selection risk), our hypothesis focuses on the bid-ask spreads.
SAMPLE SELECTION
Our starting point in identifying firms that avoid compliance with disclosure rules is a survey published by the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), which provides a list of firms protected by the injunction (IBGC, 2011). We manually checked the proxy statements of each firm traded in the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) to ascertain whether a firm was covered under the injunction. We examine all proxy statements filed for 2010 and 2011, containing information about fiscal years 2009 and 2010. We were able to identify 49 injunction firms in our manual process, eight beyond what the IBGC survey reports. IBGC only covered the proxies filed in 2010 and only firms that are listed on Bovespa differentiated governance level or are part of the IBrX 100 Index, while we cover both years 2010 and 2011 and all listed firms. Non-compliant firms typically declared that they withheld the minimum, average and maximum compensation information due to the court injunction. Figure 3 shows a sample disclosure by the non-compliant firm Vale S.A.
All financial statement data come from Economatica, a database similar to Compustat covering publicly traded firms in several Latin American countries, including Brazil. We match data from the proxy statements to the financial data from Economatica using the CVM registration number. Table 1 Panel A details the sample reconciliation. Major observation losses come from missing data, either from the proxy statement filing itself (129 firm-year observations) or from Economatica (132 firmyear observations). We exclude firms in the financial industry because they are subject to Brazil's Central Bank regulation, have different accounting standards, and face a different institutional environment (60 firm-year observations). Table 1 Panel B shows the sample breakdown by industry, year and type (non-injunction or injunction) after merging with financial data from Economatica. The sample consists of 272 non-injunction firm-years (160 unique firms) and 59 injunction firm-years (36 unique firms), totaling 331 firm-years (195 unique firms). With the exception of the manufacturing industry, there do not seem to be any concerns regarding industry clustering. To test H1, we use the total robbery rate as a proxy for executives' security-related costs. We collect the robbery rates (state-level figures per 100,000 inhabitants) from the Brazilian Forum of Public Security Yearbook (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2010). To determine the state in which the firm is located (which is the place where the executive is most likely to reside or spend most of his time), we collect the headquarters' address reported in the proxy statement.
(i) Empirical Models
We choose robbery over other types of crime based on the claim that executives are concerned about potential crimes against themselves, their families, or their property, and because kidnapping claims are underreported due to fears of retaliation. IBEF claims that the executives and their compensation can be easily identified, which can put the safety of the executive and his family at risk (5th Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro, 2010). To test H1, we use a discrete-choice probit model, in which the 15 A relatively large proportion of the observations cluster in large states like São Paulo, where social, political, and economic dynamics are very different compared to other smaller and less populous states. In order to isolate the impact of robbery rates on the decision not to disclose executive compensation, equation (1) includes control variables capturing political, social, and economic state-wide factors that may be correlated with criminal activity. In this sense, the concern that the results are driven by social, political, and economic factors in large states is mitigated. Notwithstanding, we re-estimate equation (1) excluding the observations related to São Paulo, finding qualitatively similar results to those reported in the tables. However, the results from this test must be interpreted with caution because, while the coefficient estimates on robbery rates is the same (positive), the numerical algorithm did not converge due to a low number of degrees of freedom. Hence, we could not reliably estimate standard errors for the coefficients.
Table 1
Sample Details firm's decision not to disclose is partially determined by the total robbery rates in its headquarters' state:
The variable Injunction equals one if the firm denies disclosing information under the injunction, and zero otherwise. Lagged robbery rate is the proxy we use to capture the executives' security-related costs, which represents the yearly state-level robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants. 16 A positive coefficient on Lagged robbery rate would be consistent with H1.
We control for variables that may affect the likelihood not to comply with the requirement. First, we include the logarithm of the level of CEO compensation, ln(CEO compensation), as Robinson et al. (2011) find that high levels of CEO compensation relate to executive compensation disclosure deficiencies in the United States.
17 To account for political, social, and economic disparities and inequality, we include the following four measures: the previous year's state-level Gini index (Lagged state's Gini index), the state's level of human and economic development (Lagged HDI), 18 the variability in industrial production (Lagged industrial production variation), and the variability in occupation rate (Lagged occupation rate variation). The rationale for including these measures is that more prosperous states and job markets may have lower political, social, and economic inequality costs related to high levels of CEO compensation. In addition, since these measures may be correlated with robbery rates (our proxy of executive personal costs), by controlling for these, we may be able to isolate the impact of criminality on the firm's decision not to comply with the new regulation. We also use a set of firm characteristics as control variables that may affect the decision not to comply with the new regulation. Specifically, we include firm size (ln(Total assets)), the ratio of debt to total assets (Leverage), a bankruptcy score (EM score), lagged return on assets (Lagged ROA), the market-to-book ratio (Market/book), and one-year raw stock return (1-yr stock return).
The accounting literature has widely documented ownership and control structure as an important source of information asymmetry, and consequently an important determinant of a firm's level and quality of disclosure. This is especially important in Brazil, where family ownership and control is pervasive (Leal et al., 2002; da Silva, 2004; and Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) . These powerful shareholders may play a key role in the decision to disclose executive compensation. Four variables relate to the firm's control structure: Family common and preferred stock, and Institutional common and preferred stock ownership.
19 These variables measure the proportion of common (voting) and preferred (non-voting) shares in the hands of families and institutions. 16 We use data at the state level for two reasons. First, states run the police forces in Brazil; that is, cities do not have their own police force. Consequently, all data are calculated and organized by states. Second, while there exist city-level crime rates for some states, the data is not systematically reported by all states, and often, when cities do report the data, the rates can be calculated differently, which could bring measurement errors due to heterogeneities at the city reporting level. 17 See Appendix A for a discussion of how we estimate CEO compensation for the firms that did not disclose this information. 18 The HDI is a composite of three indices: income, education, and longevity. Hence, we also disaggregate its three components, namely Lagged HDI -Income, Lagged HDI -Education, and Lagged HDI -Longevity. 19 Firms are not required to disclose family relations for stock ownership, only name people or institutions holding at least 5% of any class of stocks and their respective holdings. Hence, we identified major shareholders' last names and matched them using Levenshtein's edit distance (Levenshtein, 1965; Navarro, Next, we add controls for proprietary costs (Robinson et al., 2011) . These include the degree of firm differentiation (Differentiation), which is the sales to operating costs ratio; the size of the market within an industry (Industry size) defined as total industry sales, and the level of difficulty of entering an industry (Barriers to entry) measured as the natural logarithm of industry-weighted average PP&E.
We also control for CEO attributes. Powerful CEO is an indicator variable set to one if the CEO has been elected by the controlling shareholder, has another position in top management (e.g., is also a board member), or has relatives among top management, and zero otherwise. CEO age controls for CEO experience. We also control for the F-Index, which is a measure of family pervasiveness in top management. 20 It differs from the family ownership as it captures direct family power within firm management. We take advantage of the detailed information provided by the Brazilian proxy statements regarding family relationships within top management and board of directors to calculate the F-Index within execs, and F-Index within directors, respectively.
We also include governance-related control variables. The first is No. of analysts following, which is the number of market analysts following the firm. Closely followed firms may have different incentives than lightly followed firms when it comes to disclosure. Similarly, we control for Cross-listed, a categorical variable that indicates whether the firm is cross-listed in the US (thus subject to more strict rules and supervision by the SEC), and Subject to Bovespa's arbitration, a categorical variable set to one if the firm has voluntarily subjected itself to the Bovespa's Market Arbitration Panel. 21 The No. of board members is the size of the board of directors, while Average board members age is a proxy for directors' experience.
Finally, we have controls for firm management diversity, as diversity can influence firm management practices positively (Richard, 2000) . Women among top execs/directors is set to one if there is at least one woman among executive officers or board members, and zero otherwise. Age diversity top execs/directors, which captures diversity in generations and experience, is measured as the average of the normalized Z-scores of executives' and directors' age.
(b) Hypothesis 2: Economic Effects of Non-disclosure
We assess the effects of non-disclosure of mandatory compensation information on three information asymmetry measures: bid-ask spread, stock trading volume, and stock volatility (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) . As the dependent variables of interest are continuous, we estimate the following pooled Reif, 2010) . The algorithm groups similar last names, which we check manually to ensure accuracy. We deem these groups of similar last names as 'family'. 20 The F-Index is the normalized, position-weighted sum of all family relations divided by the number of possible relations given by the pairwise permutation formula. Namely, managers may have a weight between one (just one position) and three (CEO, VP, and officer; Chairman, VP of the board, director), i.e., w j,k ∈ {1, 2, 3} for each family member j related to family member k (Costa et al., 2014) . 21 When a firm is subject to the arbitration panel, it must comply with the ruling of Bovespa's specialists in matters regarding corporate and stock market disputes.
ordinary least squares (OLS) model: (2010, 2011) (2010, 2011) 
EconEffect k , k = 1 . . . 3, are (1) the firm's stock bid-ask spread, (2) the firm's stock trading volume, or (3) the firm's stock volatility. EconEffect is measured over the last semester of each year (i.e., from July 1 to December 31) to adequately capture the impact of the injunction decision on EconEffect.
22 When EconEffect is the stock's bidask spread (volume), it is scaled by market average bid-ask spread for the same period. We also subtract the industry-year average from the firm-year observation. This approach embeds an industry-year control, generating an industry-adjusted, or 'excess', measure. The sample includes a pre-regulation period (2007) (2008) (2009) ) and a post-regulation period (2010) (2011) . This allows us to measure whether the commitment to non-disclosure at the outset of the new regulation had any effect on the dependent variables.
Our variable of interest is New Law * Injunction, which is the interaction of variables New Law and Injunction. New Law is a categorical variable coded one in the years subsequent to the year the regulation became effective (i. We also included a set of control variables that might affect the information asymmetry measures. Lagged ln(market cap) is the logarithm of market capitalization and controls for firm size. Trading volume and Volatility are defined as before, and are included or excluded from the model, depending of the dependent variable of interest (e.g., volatility is included as an explanatory variable when bid-ask spread is the dependent variable). Lagged free float is the previous period industry-adjusted percentage of stock not held by block or institutional holders, which proxies for dispersion of control.
RESULTS

(i) Testing Hypothesis 1: Determinants of Compensation Information Non-disclosure
We present univariate tests in Table 2 . These results support the notion that injunction and non-injunction firms are fundamentally different. The first set of variables, in 22 Proxy statements are due to the regulator on May 31 of each year. However, in 2010, the first year firms had to comply with the regulation, the deadline was extended until June 30. Hence, to capture the impact of the injunction and to allow for comparability over the sample years, we estimate EconEffect over the July 1-December 31 period. Lagged industrial production variation is the previous year's state-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the industrial production index. Lagged occupation rate variation is the previous year's metropolitan-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the ratio of the number of people working to the number of economically active people. Total assets are the total assets of the firm (in BRL and in US$), and ln(Total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in BRL. Leverage is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. The EM score is the Altman's bankruptcy score for emerging markets (Altman, 2005) . Lagged ROA is the previous year's net income-to-average total assets ratio. Market/book is the market value-to-book value of equity ratio. 1-yr stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold strategy raw return. Family common stock and Institutional common stock are the proportion of common (voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Family preferred stock and Institution preferred stock are the proportion of preferred (non-voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Differentiation proxies for differentiation within an industry and is sales divided by operating costs. Industry size is the natural logarithm of total industry sales (first-level NAICS).
Barriers to entry proxies for the difficulty in entering a given industry and is the natural logarithm of the weighted average of plant, property and equipment of the industry (first-level NAICS). Powerful CEO is a dummy set to one if the controller elected the CEO, the CEO holds another position (such as a seat on the board), or the CEO has relatives in top management. CEO age proxies for CEO experience. F-Index within execs and F-Index within directors measure the proportion of relations that are 'family' within top executives and the board, respectively. No. of analysts following is the number of market analysts following the firm. Cross-listed is a dummy set to one if the firm is cross-listed in the US, and thus subject to the SEC. Subject to Bovespa's arbitration is a dummy set to one if the firm has chosen to comply with voluntary differentiated governance levels requiring that disputes must be subjected to Bovespa's market arbitration panel before resorting to traditional courts. No.
of board members proxies for staggered boards and is the quantity of directors. Average board member age proxies for directors' experience. Women among top execs/directors proxies for gender diversity and is set to one if there is at least one woman in top management. Age diversity top execs/directors proxies for age diversity among top management and is the average of the normalized Z of top executives' and directors' age.
Panel A, are the variables of interest, Lagged total robbery rate 23 , ln(CEO compensation), Lagged state's Gini index, and Lagged HDI. In support of H1, the univariate results suggest that injunction firms are headquartered in states where robbery rates are significantly higher relative to non-injunction firms. Injunction firms also exhibit larger CEO compensation, and are located in places with more inequality yet higher levels of human development. Locations where high inequality levels exist and where average human development level is high, are likely to be regions with poor families with many uneducated children and a few rich families with highly educated children. Business cycles (measured by industrial production variation) and unemployment rate are not different between injunction and non-injunction firms. Table 2 Panel B shows important firm-specific differences between firm groups. Injunction firms are larger (as measured by total assets) than their non-injunction counterparts. There is also some weaker evidence that injunction firms are more leveraged, more valuable (as measured by the market-to-book ratio) and face more barriers to entry than non-injunction firms. Table 2 Panel C shows some differences regarding CEO, governance, diversity, and board attributes. Non-injunction firms have more powerful CEOs (controller-elected or who are also part of the board). This signals that controllers may be pressing CEOs to disclose to avoid costs to the firm, even if this means personal costs for the CEO. Non-injunction firms also have older CEOs. Relative to non-injunction firms, family presence among executives and directors is lower in injunction firms. Moreover, non-injunction firms are followed by fewer analysts and less likely to be cross-listed in the US. Finally, there is weak evidence that non-injunction firms' management is more diverse in terms of age, while injunction firms exhibit larger, younger, and less experienced boards. Table 3 shows estimation results for model (1). All estimates are pooled probit regressions with year dummies and standard errors clustered by firm. The base test for H1 is in column (a), in which the coefficient on Lagged total robbery rate is positive and significant, supporting the claims that non-disclosure of executive compensation details is positively related to personal security-related costs. In economic terms, using the average partial effects, an increase of one standard deviation in the lagged total robbery rate increases the probability of injunction by 11.1 percentage points. This first specification presents interesting results concerning the control variables. The size of the firm, the financial health, and stock return increase the likelihood of injunction. Additionally, in terms of ownership, governance and control, we observe that the level of concentration of ownership (measured by family preferred), tend 23 Barros et al. (2015) identify substantial underreporting in total robbery rates in Minas Gerais (MG). We take the following steps to ensure this measurement issue does not affect our inferences. First, we downloaded the MG data again from our main source (Brazilian Forum of Public Security) to ensure we had not made a typographical error. The document (Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2010) still contains the values we originally used (i.e., rates of 61.1 and 16.4 for 2008 and 2009, respectively). Second, to avoid the underreporting, we recalculated the rates (using violent crimes against property instead of total robberies) for MG using two alternative data sources: the Public Security Department of MG (for violent crimes) and the Brazilian Census Bureau (for population estimates). Using these two sources, we have calculated rates of 294.2 and 249.9, for 2008 and 2009, respectively. These recalculations suggest that MG's rates were underestimated in the original documents. After estimating the models using the recalculated rates, we obtain the results presented in Table 3 . To further ascertain that this issue could affect our results, we re-estimate the models excluding the observations related to MG (25 firm-years as shown in Panel C of Table 1 ). December of Year2) of the ratio of the number of people working to the number of economically active people. Total assets are the total assets of the firm (in BRL and in US$), and ln(Total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in BRL. Leverage is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. The EM score is the Altman's bankruptcy score for emerging markets (Altman, 2005) . Lagged ROA is the previous year's net income-to-average total assets ratio. Market/book is the market value-to-book value of equity ratio. 1-yr stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold strategy raw return. Family common stock and Institutional common stock are the proportion of common (voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Family preferred stock and Institution preferred stock are the proportion of preferred (non-voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Differentiation proxies for differentiation within an industry and is sales divided by operating costs. Industry size is the natural logarithm of total industry sales (first-level NAICS). Barriers to entry proxies for the difficulty in entering a given industry and is the natural logarithm of the weighted average of plant, property and equipment of the industry (first-level NAICS). Powerful CEO is a dummy set to one if the controller elected the CEO, the CEO holds another position (such as a seat on the board), or the CEO has relatives in top management. CEO age proxies for CEO experience. F-Index within execs and F-Index within directors measure the proportion of relations that are 'family' within top executives and the board, respectively. No. of analysts following is the number of market analysts following the firm. Cross-listed is a dummy set to one if the firm is cross-listed in the US, and thus subject to the SEC. Subject to Bovespa's arbitration is a dummy set to one if the firm has chosen to comply with voluntary differentiated governance levels requiring that disputes must be subjected to Bovespa's market arbitration panel before resorting to traditional courts. No. of board members proxies for staggered boards and is the quantity of directors. Average board member age proxies for directors' experience. Women among top execs/directors proxies for gender diversity and is set to one if there is at least one woman in top management. Age diversity top execs/directors proxies for age diversity among top management and is the average of the normalized Z of top executives' and directors' age. 
The dependent variable is Preliminary Court Injunction (1 if firm used injunction not to disclose, 0 otherwise). The z statistics are in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Intercept and year dummies included, but now shown. Lagged total robbery rate is the previous year's total robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants, with rates corrected for Minas Gerais State (see footnote 23). CEO compensation is the maximum compensation for executive officers (no injunction) or the calculated CEO compensation (injunction), in US$100,000, and ln(CEO compensation) is the natural logarithm of the values in BRL. Lagged state's Gini index is the previous year's Gini index at the firm's headquarters state. Lagged HDI is the previous year's Human Development Index at the firm's headquarters state. Lagged HDI -Income is the previous year's state-level normalized GNI per capita. Lagged HDI -Education is the previous year's state-level normalized geometric mean of Mean years of schooling and Expected year of schooling indices. Lagged HDI -Longevity is the previous year's state-level normalized life expectancy. Lagged industrial production variation is the previous year's state-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the industrial production index. Lagged occupation rate variation is the previous year's metropolitan-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the ratio of the number of people working to the number of economically active people. Total assets are the total assets of the firm (in BRL and in US$), and ln(Total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in BRL. Leverage is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. The EM score is the Altman's bankruptcy score for emerging markets (Altman, 2005) . Lagged ROA is the previous year's net income-to-average total assets ratio. Market/book is the market value-to-book value of equity ratio. 1-yr stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold strategy raw return. Family common stock and Institutional common stock are the proportion of common (voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Family preferred stock and Institution preferred stock are the proportion of preferred (non-voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Differentiation proxies for differentiation within an industry and is sales divided by operating costs. Industry size is the natural logarithm of total industry sales (first-level NAICS). Barriers to entry proxies for the difficulty in entering a given industry and is the natural logarithm of the weighted average of plant, property and equipment of the industry (first-level NAICS). Powerful CEO is a dummy set to one if the controller elected the CEO, the CEO holds another position (such as a seat on the board), or the CEO has relatives in top management. CEO age proxies for CEO experience. F-Index within execs and F-Index within directors measure the proportion of relations that are 'family' within top executives and the board, respectively. No. of analysts following is the number of market analysts following the firm. Crosslisted is a dummy set to one if the firm is cross-listed in the US, and thus subject to the SEC. Subject to Bovespa's arbitration is a dummy set to one if the firm has chosen to comply with voluntary differentiated governance levels requiring that disputes must be subjected to Bovespa's market arbitration panel before resorting to traditional courts. No. of board members proxies for staggered boards and is the quantity of directors. Average board member age proxies for directors' experience. Women among top execs/directors proxies for gender diversity and is set to one if there is at least one woman in top management. Age diversity top execs/directors proxies for age diversity among top management and is the average of the normalized Z of top executives ' and directors' age. to increase the probability of injunction. Interestingly, the number of institutional common stock, the existence of a powerful CEO, the CEO's age, the number of analysts following, the average age of the board members, and board diversity all tend to reduce the probability of injunction. Except for the bankruptcy score and the institutional common stock, all these results hold for all other specifications tested.
We then investigate whether the estimated level of CEO compensation affects the probability of injunction. Results in column (b) show that the estimated level of CEO compensation is significant and positively related to the probability of filing an injunction. This result corroborates findings by Robinson et al. (2011) , who find that highly paid executives try to obscure compensation information. This result is also consistent with the argument that for CEOs concerned with disclosing seemingly excessive compensation, the criminality allegation would be a potentially credible excuse not to disclose. However, the coefficient of the Lagged total robbery rate remains statistically significant in the predicted direction, indicating that although CEO compensation may affect the probability of injunction, the effects of crime rates remains significant and positive. It is also interesting to note that now the family common stock level coefficient becomes positive and significant, portraying the pervasive effect of ownership concentration on the decision not to disclose executive compensation. Table 5 , with data from years 2009 and 2010. Each specification has an initial sample with double the N presented in Table 5 ( Table 3 , but changing the sample. The dependent variable is Preliminary Court Injunction (1 if firm used injunction not to disclose, 0 otherwise). The z statistics are in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Intercept and year dummies included, but now shown. Lagged total robbery rate is the previous year's total robbery rate per 100,000 inhabitants, with rates corrected for Minas Gerais State (see footnote 23). CEO compensation is the maximum compensation for executive officers (no injunction) or the calculated CEO compensation (injunction), in US$100,000, and ln(CEO compensation) is the natural logarithm of the values in BRL. Lagged state's Gini index is the previous year's Gini index at the firm's headquarters state. Lagged HDI is the previous year's Human Development Index at the firm's headquarters state. Lagged HDI -Income is the previous year's state-level normalized GNI per capita. Lagged HDI -Education is the previous year's state-level normalized geometric mean of Mean years of schooling and Expected year of schooling indices. Lagged HDI -Longevity is the previous year's state-level normalized life expectancy. Lagged industrial production variation is the previous year's state-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the industrial production index. Lagged occupation rate variation is the previous year's metropolitan-level variation (December of Year1 vs. December of Year2) of the ratio of the number of people working to the number of economically active people. Total assets are the total assets of the firm (in BRL and in US$), and ln(Total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets in BRL. Leverage is the total debt-to-total assets ratio. The EM score is the Altman's bankruptcy score for emerging markets. Lagged ROA is the previous year's net income-to-average total assets ratio. Market/book is the market value-to-book value of equity ratio. 1-yr stock return is the one-year buy-and-hold strategy raw return. Family common stock and Institutional common stock are the proportion of common (voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Family preferred stock and Institution preferred stock are the proportion of preferred (non-voting) shares held by family members and legal persons, respectively. Differentiation proxies for differentiation within an industry and is sales divided by operating costs. Industry size is the natural logarithm of total industry sales (first-level NAICS). Barriers to entry proxies for the difficulty in entering a given industry and is the natural logarithm of the weighted average of plant, property and equipment of the industry (first-level NAICS). Powerful CEO is a dummy set to one if the controller elected the CEO, the CEO holds another position (such as a seat on the board), or the CEO has relatives in top management. CEO age proxies for CEO experience. F-Index within execs and F-Index within directors measure the proportion of relations that are 'family' within top executives and the board, respectively. No. of analysts following is the number of market analysts following the firm. Crosslisted is a dummy set to one if the firm is cross-listed in the US, and thus subject to the SEC. Subject to Bovespa's arbitration is a dummy set to one if the firm has chosen to comply with voluntary differentiated governance levels requiring that disputes must be subjected to Bovespa's market arbitration panel before resorting to traditional courts. No. of board members proxies for staggered boards and is the quantity of directors. Average board member age proxies for directors' experience. Women among top execs/directors proxies for gender diversity and is set to one if there is at least one woman in top management. Age diversity top execs/directors proxies for age diversity among top management and is the average of the normalized Z of top executives' and directors' age. The model presented in column (c) includes the Gini index and the HDI level in the state. The coefficient on the Gini index is positive and significant, suggesting that firms located in places that are more unequal are more likely not to disclose compensation information. This supports the view that firms may incur political costs of disclosing high salaries in a state that has high levels of social inequality. In contrast, HDI is not significant, suggesting that development is unrelated to the decision to disclose. We must interpret this result carefully, as states with high HDI levels are also richer and more urbanized, usually implying more violence (e.g., the HDI may be capturing the criminality levels). In order to mitigate this effect, we estimate model (d) in which we include the sub-categories of the HDI: income, education and longevity. In both models (c) and (d), the coefficient of Lagged total robbery rate remains positive and significant, consistent with H1.
Finally, in columns (e) and (f) we investigate whether the decision of injunction was related not only to the level of development (HDI), but also to the business cycle of the state (industrial production and unemployment rate variations). We find no evidence that a state's positive economic cycle (industrial production) influenced the decision of injunction, but do find evidence that unemployment positively affected the decision of injunction. Again, in both models (e) and (f) the coefficient of Lagged total robbery rate remains positive and significant. The one-sided test p-value refers to the one-sided Wald test for the predictions according to Hypothesis 2, i.e., the effect of New Law * Injunction is to increase bid-ask spread, decrease trading volume, and increase volatility. The t-statistics are in parentheses. * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Intercept included, but not shown. Bid-ask spread is the firm's industry-adjusted average bid-ask spread for July 1 to December 31, divided by second semester average bid-ask. Trading volume is the industry-adjusted average daily traded value for July 1 to December 31, divided by market value multiplied by 100. Volatility is the industry-adjusted standard deviation of returns for July 1 to December 31. New Law × Injunction is the interaction of Injunction and New Law, and equals one for firms that filed for injunction in years 2010 or 2011. Injunction equals one for firms that ever filed for injunction, zero otherwise. New Law equals one for years 2010 and 2011, and zero otherwise (years 2007-2009) . Lagged ln(market cap) is the natural logarithm of the firm's market value on December 31 of the previous year. Lagged excess free float is the industry-adjusted percentage of common and preferred stocks not held by block and institutional holders on December 31 of the previous year.
In sum, it appears that security-related costs play an important role in the decision not to disclose compensation details, even after controlling for a series of firm and macroeconomic variables. In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to industry-related cycles or heterogeneities, we tested a few additional specifications. First, we drop the industry-level variables: Differentiation, Industry size, and Barriers to entry. The results for securityrelated costs persist as shown in Table 4 , columns (a) and (c). Moreover, as an attempt to control for non-observable heterogeneities among industries, we test an alternative specification substituting industry dummies for the industry-level variables. The results for the variable of interest remain positive and significant as shown in Table 4 , columns (b) and (d). These additional tests suggest that our results are robust to industryrelated cycles and heterogeneities.
Despite controlling for several variables expected to affect the decision to file for an injunction, it is possible that there are unobserved, uncontrolled variables that affect both the criminality rate and the decision of firms to file for injunction. In an attempt to mitigate these potential issues, we run two matched sample models in which we identify non-injunction firms that are closely related to injunction firms based on a set of variables in 2008, the year before the new regulation was introduced. Our goal is to determine whether our inferences hold for a matched sample of firms that were similar before the regulation based on variables previously used in the accounting literature.
First, we construct a matched sample by identifying non-injunction firms using ROA and log of total assets, following Barber and Lyon (1996) . The second matched sample identifies control firms using four matching variables, ROA, log of total assets, marketto-book ratio and sales growth, as in Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) . We were not able to match on industry, because not all injunction firms have non-injunction counterparts in the same industry that meet the matching requirements. Using data from 2008, we identify the matching firms using a nearest neighbor algorithm paired with the Mahalanobis metric for distance. We require two matching non-injunction firms for each injunction firm, with replacement (Abadie and Imbens, 2006) . The results in Table 5 show that we cannot differentiate between non-injunction firms and injunction firms based on the matching dimensions, suggesting the matching procedure was successful.
After identifying the matching firms, we re-run the original model using the two matched samples. Table 6 presents the estimation results. Column (a) presents the results using the sample based on two matching variables. Column (b) presents the results using the sample based on four matching variables. Consistent with the results in Table 3 , we find positive and significant coefficients on the lagged total robbery rate, indicating our results hold.
Finally, we check for the possibility that executives move from firms that disclose to firms that do not disclose. In our sample there is just one case of a CEO moving from a disclosing to a non-disclosing firm. Mr Murilo Ferreira moved from a disclosing firm (Litel) to a non-disclosing firm (Vale). However, the move was highly publicized in the media and motivated by political forces (e.g., Lyons, 2011) . Thus, we do not consider this a significant threat to the interpretation of our results.
(ii) Testing Hypothesis 2: Economic Effects of Non-disclosure
Next, we examine the impact of injunction on three proxies for information asymmetry: the firms' stock (a) bid-ask spread, (b) trading volume level, and (c) volatility level. Recall that these dependent variables are industry-adjusted and that most of the independent variables are lagged, which mitigates concerns about endogeneity. Furthermore, they also represent the proper timing and availability of the information to the investor. Table 7 displays the univariate statistics by firm type. All three proxies we consider exhibit significant differences, indicating that injunction firms' stocks have higher bidask spreads, are more liquid, and have higher volatility, than non-injunction firms.
Further, the results show that firm market value is significantly higher for injunction firms. Note that all of these differences can be partially attributed to the fact that injunction firms are larger.
Results in Table 8 present the estimates of model (2). All regressions are pooled OLS with a constant and standard errors clustered by firm. According to H2, we expect the coefficient on the variable New Law * Lagged injunction to be positive for bid-ask spread and volatility and negative for trading volume. Column (a) shows that injunction firms suffered a significant increase in the industry-adjusted bid-ask spread after the new law came into effect (i.e., New Law * Injunction is positive and significant), supporting H2. We interpret this result as evidence of adverse selection and agency costs. Contrary to our expectations, columns (b) and (c) show that filing for injunction does not significantly affect the excess trading volume or the excess volatility. We conjecture that this lack of result is because volume and volatility are also affected by factors other than information asymmetry and adverse selection risk (e.g., risk preferences, portfolio rebalancing decisions, and liquidity shocks). These results are partially consistent with Shin (2003) , in the sense that explicit non-disclosure increases the uncertainty about the firm. Collectively, our results indicate that a firm that explicitly decides not to comply with a disclosure rule may suffer a penalty by the market of greater bid-ask spread, but not decreases in trading volume or increases in volatility.
CONCLUSION
Theoretical disclosure models assert that in a frictionless world, full disclosure should occur. However, as frictions exist, firms assess the costs and benefits of disclosing before releasing their private information. Corporate scandals in the mid-2000s and the financial crisis of 2008 increased the demand for disclosure of executive compensation, on the basis that more compensation information would reduce agency costs. Brazil answered this call by implementing a new regulation in 2009, CVM Ordinance 480, one of the most complex and comprehensive sets of disclosure rules ever implemented in the Brazilian market.
We examine the determinants and consequences of firms' choice not to comply with executive compensation disclosure regulation. We take advantage of a unique feature of the Brazilian market, where the change of regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security-related costs for executives. We exploit the tension between the potential benefits of disclosure to the owners and the potential personal costs of the executives. Firms that managed to circumvent the requirements of CVM Ordinance 480 did so through a court injunction. Injunction firms alleged that disclosing executive compensation information would reveal the identity of top executives, and that criminals would use this information to plan abductions and other crimes against executives, their families, and their property.
Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive association between securityrelated costs and the decision not to comply with the new regulation. This is a novel result, in which firms appear to consider executives' personal costs in the decision to comply with mandatory disclosure regulation. We believe that we bring a new factor to the regulatory debate, supporting the view of Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) and Frantz et al. (2013) that increased disclosure may imply increased costs.
Regarding the consequences of non-compliance, we find that injunction firms experience an increase in stock bid-ask spread. This is consistent with the market interpreting the non-disclosure as bad news, leading to an increase in uncertainty (Shin, 2003) . Collectively, our results suggest that although firms suffer a significant penalty by the market, firms consider their executives' costs as high enough to justify the non-disclosure. More importantly, our results demonstrate that there may be more costs associated with disclosure than generally accepted. We believe we bring useful insights to regulatory and standard-setting bodies like the European Commission and the International Accounting Standards Board.
APPENDIX A
Estimation of CEO Compensation
CEO compensation in Brazil is not directly observable. The new regulation, CVM Ordinance 480, requires firms to disclose total, minimum, maximum and average compensation, by group: executives and board of directors. Figure A .1 is a sample disclosure for a complying firm, Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) for fiscal year 2009, with key translations from Portuguese into English. The figure shows, by board of directors and executives, the number of members in each group, the minimum, maximum and mean compensation. Each complying firm follows a format similar to that of Petrobras, so we assume the maximum compensation among executive officers represents the compensation for the CEO. Our assumption is reasonable, since the IBEF specifically argued in the court filing that the maximum compensation would always be that of the CEO:
Although CVM Ordinance 480 does not mandate the disclosure of the name of the administrators [with their respective compensation], there will be no difficulty in identifying them, since without exception the CEO and/or the Chairperson is the one with the highest compensation -and often, these are notable people (5th Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro, 2010).
In contrast to complying (non-injunction) firms, injunction firms did not disclose the minimum, maximum or average compensation. These firms only reported the number of executives and the total amount of compensation for all executives. Figure  A. 2 is a sample disclosure for an injunction firm, Vale S.A. for fiscal year 2009, with key translations from Portuguese into English. While Vale S.A. provided information for board members, executives and audit committee members, our focus is on the executive officers' tab of the figure. To calculate CEO compensation for injunction firms, we use data from the complying (non-injunction) firms to calculate a ratio of CEO compensation to non-CEO executive officer compensation. From this ratio, we then derive the CEO compensation for injunction firms using the number of executives and the total compensation for all the executive officers.
We begin by deriving CEOCompRatio, which is an index of how much more a CEO earns in relation to the average executive officer in each complying firm: Translations from Portuguese into English
Note: The figure shows, by board of directors and executive officers, the number of members in each group, the minimum, maximum and mean compensation. Each complying firm follows a format similar to that of Petrobras, so we assume the maximum compensation among executive officers represents the compensation for the CEO.
Next, we calculate the average of CEOCompRatio at the industry-year level (AvgCEORatio), where the industry is determined by the first level of the NAICS classification provided by Economatica, our source of financial information. If we are unable to obtain an AvgCEORatio for a given injunction-firm-year (due to a lack of industry-year observations), we use the industry average across years. For any remaining observations for which we cannot calculate an AvgCEORatio at the industry-year level, we use the yearly average. Finally, we calculate CEO compensation for injunction firms by applying AvgCEORatio to each injunction firm's average executive compensation: The figure shows the number of executive officers and the total compensation paid to the entire group. Each injunction firm follows a format similar to that of Vale S.A. Hence, to calculate CEO compensation for injunction firms, we follow the steps outlined here.
APPENDIX B
IBGC's list of injunction (non-disclosing) firms
The list below shows the injunction firms that denied disclosing executive compensation per CVM Ordinance 480. 
